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WHAT IS TOUCHE ROSS INTERNATIONAL?

munications. in today's complex multinational environment, no one can possibly know all the answers, and the
wise professional makes regular use of all research facilities and data banks available to him.
The last and most elusive resource of the professional is
the utilization of his time. In all international engagements, the firm constantly strives to balance and blend
the time and experience of its professionals to provide
adequately for planning, performing, and controlling the
professional procedures and administration. The cohesiveness of an international organization is critical to the
effective planning and execution of engagements, and our
new management organization greatly strengthens our
capacity to serve.

What achievements will louche Ross International be able
to point to in the future as a result of this latest reorganization of its structure?

The primary one will be more qualified people in all of
our offices. When you have established a requirement, as
we have under our Policy Agreement, that admission of
a partner in Melbourne, Manchester, Chicago, or Madrid
requires the approval of our board of governors, you are
telling each young professional that to become a partner
he must have an exposure and an outlook that stretches
beyond his national boundary. The result will be a new
generation of partners w h o will think of themselves as
part of Touche Ross International, not just of the Canadian
firm, the Lebanese- firm, or the United States firm. They
will seek opportunities to move from one operating entity to another, and the multinational character of our
practice will take on a new dimension.
Through the exercise of strong, central leadership, we
will be able to focus our resources where they are needed.
This means that throughout Touche Ross International, we
will be able to grow faster and provide superior service.
Each of the operating entities w i l l have the full support of
TRI in the development of its territory, and together, we
will match our development w i t h the development of
multinational business. The steps we are taking now to
build an effective professional capacity in Kuwait and Abu
Dhabi in the Middle East are an example of the potential
for the reallocation of resources to meet our changing
international environment. I am very excited about the
potential for a truly multinational public accounting firm
that can turn both the growth of international trade and
a preference for nationalism to its advantage.
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EEC-THE CHALLENGE
FROM EUROPE
By WILLIAM R. S. RITCHIE,
Chairman, Board of Governors, TRI
When Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined last year, the
European Economic Community—the C o m m o n M a r k e t became the most populous market in the developed w o r l d .
Serving more than 250 million consumers, it is today a
bigger market than either the United States or the Soviet
Union, and is the world's largest overseas trader.
If the Common Market's size and purchasing power
establish it as an economic giant, however, its full potential
will not be reached until the nine member states move
closer to industrial and financial integration.
Population and overseas trade, in other words, are not
everything. Europe, long fragmented into warring nations,
has a good distance to go before it can match the United
States in output per head, in standard of living, and in
sophistication of business methods. The per capita income
of Americans is around $5,000 a year, for example; of Europeans, $2,500—half as much. In terms of primary energy,
another measure of economic strength, the United States
uses around 10 tons of coal equivalent a year per head; the
EEC only 2 tons—one-fifth as much.
At present, therefore, this still fragile union hardly qualifies for the role of political super-power in which some of
its more hot-headed enthusiasts seem to have cast it. Indeed, a measure of modesty is fitting here, for it is only a
generation since the countries of western Europe all but
destroyed themselves as free people living in reasonably
affluent societies.
Anarchy and collapse were prevented in the post-war
years by a generous and forward-looking America. The
Marshall Plan envisaged the European countries drawing
up their own program for revival and then acting in unity.
The program should, in General Marshall's o w n words, be
"agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations."
So began the move to western European unity. Belgium,
Luxemburg, and the Netherlands formed the first economic union, as the Benelux nations.Together w i t h France,
West Germany, and Italy, they set up a common market in
coal, steel, iron ore, and scrap in 1952. In 1958, they
merged their separate national markets into one trading

area and one agricultural and industrial system. In 1973
they were joined by Britain, Ireland, and Denmark.
All nine members have pledged themselves to achieve
political, economic, and monetary union, with a common
currency and common foreign policies. The target date for
this full union is 1980, but in light of current financial and
political developments, this seems to be too optimistic.
What matters now for Europe is the direction in which she
moves, rather than the speed at which she is moving.
For the present, the Community is a customs union, with
the immediate goal of a free flow of capital, goods, and
labor between members. It has in principle, and to varying
degrees in practice, a common policy on energy, farm price
supports, subsidies for relatively under-developed or industrially obsolete areas, steel output and pricing, measures to check inflation, social policy, and so on.
The Community also has special trading arrangements
with so-called "Associates," mostly non-member European countries such as Sweden and Switzerland and former
colonial areas overseas. These arrangements have created
a duty-free area for industrial goods of well over 300 million persons. They offer, for example, tariff advantages for
agricultural products —for North African fruit, say, in competition with North American fruit. Such tariff advantages
are only marginal issues with other nations, however. A
much more serious obstacle for would-be exporters to
Europe is the virtual self-sufficiency of the Community in
food production.
Naturally, as in all human affairs, Common Market idealism is laced with a strong dose of realistic horse-trading
between members. When inflation, or a realignment of
currencies, starts to affect the income of the farmer or the
expenditure of the factory worker, each separate government seeks to redress the balance in the interest of its own
nationals. The same horse-trading occurs when the members discuss how to distribute central funds for regional
development. It is rather easy to do this, since power rests
with a Council of Ministers on which each nation is represented. A European Parliament, whose members are chosen
from the national parliaments, is still in a rudimentary
state, although there is a growing call for direct elections
that would be a considerable step on the way to a federal
assembly for a United States of Europe.
The Promise of Growth
Despite the strong sense of national interest behind the
facade of unity, the EEC has largely fulfilled the initial economic hopes of its founders. In their first dozen years
together, trade between the Six increased by over 600 per-

cent. Their trade with the outside world rose by over 200
percent, whereas that of Britain, then still a non-member,
rose by only about 130 percent. Their national income rose
by around five percent a year, compared with around three
percent in Britain. Although other factors are obviously involved, the general opinion is that union has given the Six
a decisive economic and psychological boost; and this
belief was behind the campaign to take Britain herself into
Europe.
It has become apparent, though, that sustained European growth is being hampered because the structure of
European industry lags behind the opportunities now open
to it. There is a US-size market, but it is served by firms,
based in individual states, which lack the size and knowhow of the typical American corporation.
US business has not been slow to see the point, and in
fact has moved in to provide the kind of productivity which
Europeans seem unable or unwilling to create for themselves. United States assets in the present nine members
have risen from around $3.5 billion in the year before the
EEC was born to between $20 billion and $30 billion now.
It has indeed been argued that American business has
done much better in the Common Market than has European business, and some of the more sensitive European
patriots tend to lose sleep over what they ruefully call the
American challenge to Europe.
What Europe needs, of course, is truly multinational industrial units large enough to profit from the economies
of selling in an international market. At present, for example, her leading automobile producer, Volkswagen, has
sales of around $5 billion a year, only about one-sixth of
General Motors.
The obstacles are formidable, both in theory and practice. Europe needs mergers across frontiers to ensure economic growth and political unity, but the EEC is based on a
philosophy of leaving as much initiative as possible to market forces. In addition, the Treaty of Rome insists that no
mergers shall be allowed which threaten to reduce competition significantly.
This contradiction between efficiency and freedom of
consumer choice is not unique to Europe; but in many
countries the relevant criteria are fairly clear and can be
brought into effect with reasonable speed. In Britain and
West Germany, for example, a decision on an internal
merger takes on average about four months; and in both
countries a body of 'case law' has been established which
allows firms to judge accurately in advance which merger
schemes are worth initiating.
The European Commission, on the other hand, is more
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geared to the letter, as distinct from the spirit, of a still
tentative system of law; and decisions take on average from
three to four years. One would hope that British membership in the EEC might help to speed up the process of substituting a practical for a legalistic approach to merger
problems. Even when reasonable guidelines are laid d o w n ,
however, and the administrative machine is streamlined to
carry them into effect, much will remain to be done towards harmonising laws, business procedures, and professional practices among the nine individual nations.
Accountancy, for example, varies enormously from one
country to another. In some countries, the profession is
much more advanced than in others, and the procedures
vary from country to country according to the business
climate, its sources of finance, and the local system of
taxation. In my own country, the overriding criterion in the
production of financial statements is that the statement
should give a "true and fair v i e w " of the affairs of the
concern being reported upon. In some other countries
the emphasis is different.
Drawing up agreed accounting standards will inevitably
be a slow and painful process.
The Impact of Oil Prices
The slow but convincing trend towards closer unity in
Europe has received a major check—from the sudden
escalation of oil prices and the immense burden this places
on the foreign currency reserves of member states.
Since the war, Europe has been running down her indigenous coal industry and relying for the greater part of
her energy needs on imports of oil, mainly from the M i d dle East. By 1980, the EEC countries plan to import 700
million tons of oil a year, in contrast to 12 or so million
produced at home. W i t h this development, w i t h the United
States one of the world's largest oil producers herself becoming a net importer of oil, and w i t h Japan's "economic
miracle" being almost wholly built on imported oil, the
major oil producers last year realized they were in a permanent seller's market. Accordingly they stepped up their
prices three-fold in a few months.
In the EEC, only West Germany and perhaps Belgium
can hope to take the strain of higher energy costs on their
balance of payments. Italy has already been driven to impose general import controls in defiance of basic EEC policies—and without consultation—thus showing how fragile
European unity still is when it appears to stand in the way
of basic national interests.
Behind this immediate threat to political integration
and economic growth in Europe lies the yet unsolved prob10

lem of how to recycle the vast surpluses flowing into the
oil producers' exchequers, preventing them from swamping the world's monetary system and wrecking its complex
trading relationships. In this, Europe's interests are basically at one with those of the United States.
From Britain's point of view, however, there is light on
the horizon. First, she w i l l occupy a position of special
responsibility, through the residual role of sterling as a
reserve currency and the financial expertise of the City of
London.
Second, there is one new factor which will have a dramatic effect on her economic future. By 1980 Britain, alone
among Community members, will have become one of the
world's major oil producers. Present estimates suggest an
output of up to 140 million tons a year—slightly higher per
capita than the current output of the United States. Britain
is indeed the only substantial industrial unit in the w o r l d ,
including the United States and the Soviet bloc, which can
expect to be self-supporting in energy supplies ten years
from now.
The consequences for Britain's economic performance
could be enormous. She will be spared a bill of upwards
of $4 billion a year for energy imports, and should collect
as much or more in taxation from oil companies operating
in the North Sea. She will have an assured crisis-free source
of reasonably low-cost energy on her o w n doorstep, thus
improving her comparative industrial production costs.
Even before oil begins to flow in decisive quantities, towards the end of the 1970's, she w i l l be able to use her oil
reserves as collateral for any international loans she needs
to raise in order to bridge current balance of payments
deficits.
So there is an element of irony in the way the British
Treasury is calling for a reduced contribution to the European Community budget on the ground of Britain's recent
modest economic performance, while the Community's
experts are forecasting for Britain an early balance of payments surplus and a significant growth in national income
as a result of her oil bonanza.
However, one caveat should be given. In the last few
months, in common w i t h other countries throughout the
w o r l d , some EEC countries have experienced critical political changes that leave the prospects of the Community
even more uncertain than before. The one thing that is
certain is that during the next decade both EEC's and Britain's role in the w o r l d will be undergoing still further dramatic change. And after the referendum in June, we shall
know if this change will take place w i t h i n or outside the
Common Market.
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